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It is becoming more apparent that there is a need for service providers to update their 
deployment plans for Internet Protocol version 6 or IPv6. The availability of IPv4 addresses is 
expected to reach exhaustion in late 2011 [1]. Transition to IPv6 will not happen all at once. 
Devices using IPv6 networking, are being introduced to an environment entrenched with 
Internet Protocol version 4 or IPv4. For network service and infrastructure providers, this 
means a period of time where support for both Internet protocols will be necessary. The “dual 
IPv4, IPv6 stack” is a reality to be dealt with for the next several years.  
IPv6 solves the IP address capacity problem and brings new features but it also brings 
new risks. The “dual stack” approach increases the number of potential contact points between 
networked devices and will require an increase to the scope of interface management. For the 
network administrator, it will be important to understand how the “dual stack” environment 
will function and how to assure security. 
Technology providers have been implementing IPv6 capabilities including networking 
services and security tools for the past several years in anticipation for the transition from IPv4 
to IPv6. This thesis will describe the technical background and an experiment to test the 
capability of two different host based applications for effective packet filtering in a dual IPv4, 
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Table 1. Terminology, Portions adapted from RFC 2460 [2] 
Node a device, e.g., a computer that implements either or both Internet protocol 
version 4 or version 6 
Router a device that forwards IP packets not explicitly addressed to itself 
Host any node that is not a router 
Upper layer a protocol layer above the IP layer 
Link a communication facility or medium over which nodes can communicate at 
the link layer or the layer immediately below the IP layer. An example would 
be Ethernet. 
Neighbors nodes attached to the same link 
Interface  a node’s attachment to the link 
Address an ip layer identifier for an interface 
Packet  an IP header plus its payload 
Link MTU the maximum transmission unit or maximum packet size in bytes or octets 
Path MTU  the minimum transmission unit of all the links between a source and 
destination  
Firewall a hardware of software device that sits between the network and a host or 
another network that filters Internet packets and grants access based on 
specific rules. 
Stateful packet filtering a type of filtering which requires monitoring a series of packet between a 
given source and destination over time so as to track state or status.  
Stateful configuration When a node receives configuration parameters from a known authoritative 





1.1 Thesis statement 
While it has been fifteen years since it was formally proposed [2], Internet Protocol 
version 6, or IPv6, is poised to become a significant factor in global computer networking in the 
next few years. Every computerized device wishing to connect to the Internet requires a unique 
address. The current Internet Protocol, version 4, or IPv4 is expected to reach address 
exhaustion in late 2011 [3], [1]. IPv6 extends global networking significantly by offering a 
greater capacity for unique host address numbers. IPv6 also promises efficiencies for routing, 
configuration, and security. 
The list of those involved or active with IPv6 grows almost daily. Microsoft® and Cisco 
Systems, Inc. have included IPv6 features in their products [4] for years. Network carriers such 
as Comcast®, AT&T™ and Verizon [5], [6], [7] have made IPv6 part of their business activities. 
Google™ [8] provides a search engine for the IPv6 Internet. Government agencies worldwide [9] 
[10] have active plans for IPv6 deployment.  
It is valuable to study the capability of current systems as part of the preparations for 
IPv6 deployment. IPv6 shares many of the approaches used with IPv4 but is a completely 
different format with new features and associated security threats. Support for both IPv4 and 
IPv6 will be necessary during a transition period which may last for many years. Methods that 
provide economies of scale will be advantageous when considering adding IPv6 capabilities to 
an existing IPv4 service.  
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Firewalls are an essential part of security for any networked computer device. Firewalls 
regulate connectivity or access between computers on or across networks by blocking or 
allowing access to Internet protocol packets based on their characteristics or contents. Modern 
firewall applications must include both IPv4 and IPv6 capabilities. Experts have suggested that 
firewall designers provide a level of common rule leveraging or “cloning” [11]. 
With IPv6 on the horizon, it is time to consider packet filtering for dual, IPv4/IPv6 
networked services. The goal of this study is to evaluate the capability and effectiveness of 
operating system applications to provide packet filter firewalling for services bound to both 
version 4 and 6 Internet protocols. To the best of my knowledge a study with this specificity has 
not been published before.  
1.2 Understanding the need for firewall research 
A survey published in 2007 indicates that only 30% of commercial firewall products 
offered support IPv6 [12]. This study did not include personal workstation, host computer or 
operating system firewalls. Instead it focused on network level or appliance firewall devices 
which are certainly a key part of any complex networked system. The opportunity exists to 
further understanding of how IPv6 will impact the firewall applications for host systems 
functioning as network servers. This thesis will provide background and empirical research in 





1.2.1 Firewall fundamentals 
The ease of use for sharing digital information through networked computer devices has 
revolutionized the modern world. Nefarious users, however seek to abuse this ease of 
information sharing which has spanned the field of computer security. Computer security 
methods seek to manage access to and protect information stored on networked systems.  
The domain of computer security is often described in terms of Confidentiality, Integrity, 
and Availability or CIA. Some information is meant to be kept secret or confidential between 
certain parties. The integrity or truthfulness of digital information or users is important. 
Authentication is an integrity verification technique and is commonly applied to both users and 
information. Availability references the scope and application of computer security techniques. 
A security solution must provide continuous protection and provide a means for those properly 
authorized to access protected information or system configuration controls.  
A firewall is one of the fundamental technologies for providing control of access to 
computer services and the information they provide. The scope of firewall policy includes 
filtering parameters that are applied to the fundamental digital packet or the higher level, 
application level information such as webpage or email content. Firewall devices may also 
include functionality for; authorization, encryption, monitoring, logging, and analysis of traffic 
flows for certain behavior or intrusion detection techniques. Packet filtering within the firewall 
however remains as a fundamental component and an area that is impacted by the migration 
from IPv4 to IPv6.  
Firewalls are typically deployed in two different scenarios; on host systems such as 
servers or workstations or as dedicated appliances between networks. Many businesses have a 
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firewall device between their corporate network and connection to an Internet service 
provider. 
We know that IPv6 is coming and requires upgrades to both user and network 
infrastructure including workstations, routers, servers, and security devices such as firewalls. 
Ideally, the transition to IPv6 will happen quietly during the night as system administrator’s 
work diligently in the background. Getting to this point however will require significant 
preparation. 
1.3 IPv6 overview 
IPv6 represents a new format for the messages exchanged across the global Internet. 
The following section will review and compare the technical aspects of IPv6 and IPv4. 
1.3.1 IPv6 RFCs 
The specifications that make up IPv6 have been recorded in a series of documents called 
requests for comments or RFCs. RFCs are the method that scientists and engineers use to 
negotiate and formalize the details related to computer networking and are maintained by the 
Internet Engineering Task Force or IETF. The entire collection of RFCs, which is now approaching 
6000, documents the evolution of computer networking technology. Developers of computer 
equipment and software use RFCs as a guideline for product requirements. IPv6 has a legacy of 
RFCs which started in the early 1990s and continues up to the present. These documents 
include the definition of the IPv6 packet, address, Internet control message protocol and 




Table 2. Major RFCs relating to IPv6 
 Title rfc date rfc date rfc date 
1 Internet Protocol, version 6 (IPv6) 1883 Dec-95 2460 Dec-98     
2 IP Version 6 Addressing Architecture 2372 Jul-98 3515 Apr-03 4291 Feb-06 
3 Internet Control Message Protocol 
(ICMPv6) for the Internet Protocol 
Version 6 (IPv6) Specification 
1885 Dec-95 2463 Dec-98 4443 Mar-06 
4 Neighbor Discovery for IP version 6 
(IPv6), IP to link layer address, like 
ARP, introduces NS, NA, RS, RA 
1970 Aug-96 2461 Dec-98 4861 Sep-07 
5 Secure Neighbor Discovery (SEND) 3971 Mar-05         
6 IPv6 Stateless Auto configuration, uses 
NS, NA, RS, RA, introduces DAD 
1971 Aug-96 2462 Dec-98 4862 Sep-07 
7 Path MTU Discovery for IP version 6 1981 Aug-96         
8 Recommendations for Filtering 
ICMPv6 Messages in Firewalls 
4890 May-07         
9 Basic Transition Mechanisms for IPv6 
Hosts and Routers 
1933 Apr-96 2893 Aug-00 4213 Oct-05 
10 Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol 
for IPv6 (DHCPv6) 
3315 Jul-03         
11 DNS Extensions to Support IPv6 
Address Aggregation and 
Renumbering 
2874 Jan-00         
12 IP Authentication Header 1826 Aug-95 2402 Nov-98 4302 Oct-05 
13 IP Encapsulation Security Payload 1827 Aug-95 2406 Nov-98 4303 Dec-05 
14 Deprecation of Type 0 Routing 
Headers in IPv6 
5095 Dec-07         
15 Mobility Support in IPv6, one of many 3775 Jun-04         
 
The first two RFCs listed, 2460 and 4291 are the core descriptors of the IPv6 message 
format and address scheme. The address architecture has been revised twice and the core IPv6 
specification only once. IPv6 includes a new Internet Control and Management Protocol, 
ICMPv6, which includes functionality address resolution protocol (ARP) and Internet group 
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management protocol (IGMP) which are two protocols that for IPv4 are separate. ICMPv6 
includes other functions such as Neighbor Discovery, Auto configuration, and Path Discovery. 
These permit network nodes to be more independent but require the exchange of ICMPv6 
protocol messages.  
There are a variety of other RFCs related to IPv6 that propose transition mechanisms 
such as IPv6 tunnels over IPv4 networks, and updates to other popular network functions such 
as Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) and Domain Name Services (DNS). Embedded 
security features including authentication and encryption are also features of IPv6 and are 
described by RFCs. Mobile node support continues to be an area for development in IPv6. 
Recently there have been two RFCs related to packet filter firewalling. RFC 4890 
provides recommendations for filtering IMCPv6 messages, a portion of which are required for 
proper functioning of IPv6 [13]. RFC 5095 depreciates routing headers, a type of extension 
header that can permit networking around network firewall devices [14] [15]. Recent RFC’s 
demonstrate a maturing of the IPv6 technology and an emphasis on security.  
1.3.2 Where IPv6 fits into the network “stack” 
The migration to IPv6 represents a change to one of the essential components that 
make up the computer network system. Internet protocol is the technology that makes the 
global connection of disparate networks function as one unified network. The most successful 
Internet protocol is IPv4 which was specified in 1981 [16]. 
The computer networking system is modeled conceptually as a stack of functional or 
modular layers. The Open System Interconnect or OSI model is often used to describe this 
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stack. Each layer has a related protocol or application and relates to a kind of data structure or 
representation.  
Table 3. OSI Model and related protocols and data structures 
OSI model layer Application-Protocol Data Structures 
7 Application 
SMTP, FTP, HTTP, 
DNS, SNMP, Telnet 
files 
6 Presentation data 
5 Session socket, port number 
4 Transport TCP, UDP, SCTP 
streams, connections, 
datagram 
3 Network IPv4  |  IPv6  packets 
2 Data Link LAN (e.g., Ethernet) 
WAN 
bits, bytes, frames 
1 Physical  wires, fibers, radio 
 
Internet protocol is the technology that allows disparate networks to communicate. It 
sits between local area network technologies like Ethernet and connection orientated 
approaches called, transport, e.g., TCP or UDP protocols. Changing the network layer from IPv4 
to IPv6 will affect interfaces to the transport and data link layers. Many network interfaces have 
capabilities for dual stack, meaning they can implement or understand IP messages that are 
either IPv4 or IPv6. Both Windows© Vista, 7, and many variations of Linux have dual IPv4, IPv6 
network interface capabilities. Even though IPv6 is different it will run on existing data link 
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network technologies such as Ethernet and it will carry common transport protocols such as 
TCP and UPD in a similar manner as IPv4.  
1.3.3 IPv6 packet architecture compared to IPv4 
IPv6 presents a new and streamlined header format for IP packets. IPv6 specifies a fixed 
size packet header which includes a much larger address capacity and removes parts that were 
redundant or used infrequently.  
IPv6 packet components (number of bits)           IPv4 packet components (number of bits) 
      # of Bytes 
 
Figure 1. Comparison of IPv6 and IPv4 packets 
 
The first four bits of either IP header represent the version number which will guide any 
processing algorithm. Header length in IPv6 has been fixed at 40 bytes as compared to the 
variable length available with IPv4 of 20 to 60 bytes, so in IPv6 there is not any HLEN tag. The 
IPv6 header replaces “service” with “traffic class” and “flow label.” These are designations 
designed to assist with the management of quality of service or priority for certain Internet 
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traffic. Payload length in IPv6 describes the length of the packet (header plus data payload) 
where IPv4 had the Total Length flag.  
1.3.3.1 Fragmentation in IPv6 is specified by a special type of extension header  
The fragmentation options, originally part of the IPv4 header, are designated as one of 
the extension headers in the IPv6 header [2]. Fragmentation occurs when IP packets are larger 
than the data link layer packet size or MTU (minimum transfer unit) of a network segment that 
they traverse. IP packets that are larger than a given data link MTU must be broken down into 
smaller pieces and then eventually reassembled at their destination. An IP packet will traverses 
various data links with different MTUs as it flows across the global Internet. The links with the 
MTUs smaller than the IP packet’s actual size are critical in this process.  
Ethernet, for example, typically has a data link layer size of 1500 bytes. The minimum 
packet size for an IPv6 datagram is 1280 bytes but can be as large as 65,535 bytes, or even 
larger if the jumbo gram option is used. When IP datagrams are larger than 1500 bytes, 
Ethernets maximum packet size, fragmentation is required.  
 Fragmentation impacts networking performance as systems spend time processing or 
fragmenting and defragmenting packets. RFC 1981 “Path MTU Discovery for IP version 6” which 
described how a node should determine the minimum MTU based on a given path and then set 
the packet size to avoid the need for fragmentation. The architects of IPv6 wish to move the 
responsibility for fragmentation from network routers, which is where it occurs in IPv4 systems, 
to the source or originating node. This will require the path discovery and maintenance process 
to be successful. 
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1.3.3.2 TTL has been replaced by Hop Limit 
The Time to Live or TTL flag from the IPv4 header has been replaced by the Hop Limit 
flag in the IPv6 header. Both exist as a means to prevent IP datagrams from being routed 
around the Internet indefinitely. Hop Limit in IPv6 formalizes this descriptor and specifies the 
maximum number of routers that an IPv6 packet may traverse a before it is dropped.  
1.3.3.3 Next Header or Protocol and checksum 
The IPv6 includes a “next header” indicator which is similar to the “protocol” flag in the 
IPv4 header. “Next header” describes the protocol of the payload of the particular IP packet. I 
will elaborate on the various types of protocol codes in a subsequent section. In the IPv6 
header there is no checksum flag. The functionality of a checksum, to verify the integrity of the 
IP header and payload, is redundant with the functionality in other lower or upper level 
networking components e.g., data link or transport layers. With IPv4 routing the checksum has 
to be evaluated and recalculated at each router along the way. Removing the checksum 
requirement from the IPv6 header is intended to improve routing performance by illuminating 
this unused integrity check.  
1.3.3.4 Address specification 
The IPv6 header contains the source and destination address which is 128 bits in length 
compared to 32 bits with IPv4. IPv6 allows for 340 billion, billion, billion, billion addresses 
(=2128) as compared to 4 billion addresses (=232) with IPv4.  
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1.3.4  IP address representation and assignment 
Digital representations of either IPv4 or IPv6 addresses as a string of ones and zeros are 
too cumbersome for humans to deal with so shorthand notations have been developed. IPv4 
represents a 32 bit address with a string of four, base ten, numbers ranging from 0 to 255 
separated by decimals, e.g., 192.168.100.130. Each base ten number element represents 8 bits. 
IPv6 represents a 128 bit address with a string of, up to 8 groups, of 4 each, base 16 (or hex) 
digits, separated by colons ( : ), e.g., fe80::d0g0:bafd:c706:6574. With this notation for IPv6, 
strings of two or more zeros can be represented by a double colon (: :).  
IP addresses are allocated or assigned by a registration process coordinated by the 
Internet Assigned Numbers Authority or IANA. It is assumed that certain IP address numbers 
will be used for certain purposes and scopes. It is also possible for a computer to have several 
network interfaces. In the case of IPv4 networking, one computer network interface usually has 
one IP address or node. IPv6 extends this concept; in fact most IPv6 nodes will have multiple 
addresses relating to the scope or type of the communication that is assumed. Figure 2 shows 
the various types of addresses and examples of prefixes for each.  
Types and examples of IPv6 addresses 
128 bits represented by 8 groups of 4 each base 16 digits separated by colons 
(:) 
scope 
type # connections link - local global 
loopback self ::1 na 
unicast 1:1 FE80::/10 2000::/3 
multicast 1:n FF00::/8 tbd 
anycast nearest tbd tbd 




Types and examples of IPv4 addresses 
32 bit represented by 4 groups of 3 each, base 10 digits separated by dots (.) 
scope 
type # connections link - local/private global/public 
loopback self 127.0.0.1 na 
unicast 1:1 10/8, 172.16/12, 192.168/16 everything else 
multicast 1:n 224.0.0.0/24 224-239/8 
anycast nearest na na 
broadcast all 255.255.255.255 na 
 
Figure 2. Types and examples of IPv6 and IPv4 address prefixes 
Network communications may occur within a host computer. One way a computer can 
communicate with itself using networking technology is by using the “loopback” address. This is 
just one IP address number that has been set aside to mean “this computer.” The loopback 
address for IPv6 is “::1.” With IPv4 the loopback address is “127.0.0.1.” Loopback addresses are 
useful for diagnostic or development purposes.  
Unicast addresses are used for communications between two nodes or computer 
devices on a network and referred to as 1 to 1 communication. The most basic form of a 
computer network is two or more computers sharing a local area network (LAN) or data link 
technology such as Ethernet. IPv6 specifies a “link-local” address starting with the prefix”FE80” 
and is configured automatically using the network interface’s media access control or MAC 
address as a suffix [17]. A MAC or IEEE 802 address is a unique 48 bit number programmed into 
the network electronics. The link-local address is intended to be used for a device to 
communicate to its immediate neighbors and receive configuration information from a nearby 
router on obtaining a global IPv6 address. Global IPv6 addresses are intended to be used on the 
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global Internet. IPv6 link-local and global addresses are like the “private” and “public” in IPv4 
systems.  
IPv6 expands the capability for multicast addresses. Multicast is a method of message 
transmission where one computer node sends messages to multiple nodes. Computer nodes 
must first join a multicast group and agree to share messages. IPv4 has multicast capability but 
it never really caught on. IPv6 offers additional multicast addresses and their use is being 
promoted for applications such as video conferencing, entertainment content distribution and 
system administration. Sometimes multicast is used by a group of routers within a network 
system. 
IPv6 adds a type of address called “anycast.” This is an address type used to connect to 
or commutate with the nearest or first responding device of some type or category. For 
example, a node may want to contact the nearest router or shared network printer.  
The “broadcast,” to all nodes, address from IPv4 of 255.255.255.255 has been de-
emphasized in IPv6. In order to reduce network chatter, IPv6 experts recommend the use of 
multicast or anycast addresses. This should improve network utilization or efficiency. Each 
computer device node will probably have at a minimum; link-local, global addresses and 
possibly one or more multicast addresses. This expansion of possible network contact points 
places additional burden on packet filters or firewalls that use address based rules for packet 
filtering. Additional workload is place upon network resources that manage multicast and 
anycast group identifiers and route IP packets to these addresses. 
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1.3.5 Next header or protocol codes 
The primary task of the Internet Protocol header is to serve as a “wrapper” or container 
for some other message data, e.g., Transport datagram. The Internet Protocol packet consists 
of the header and the payload of other protocol data. The contents of the payload of a given 
Internet protocol packet are indentified by the “Next Header” tag in the IPv6 header and the 
“Protocol” flag in the IPv4 header. The “Next Header” or “Protocol” flags are information used 
by packet filtering firewalls after the address.  
Table 4 displays the code decimal number and the protocol name represented by that 
number and a descriptor of what IP version the protocol applies to [18]. Some of the IPv6 “next 
header” protocols are designated as extension headers. These can be nested or encapsulated in 
each other. The recommended order for this nesting is described in the last column.  
Table 4. Codes: IPv4/Protocol and IPv6/Next Header 
Codes : IPv4 - Protocol and IPv6 -Next Header  
registry 
decimal Protocol IP version 
expected 
order 
0 Hop-by-Hop Options 
IPv6, Ext. 
Header 1 
1 ICMP (Internet Control Message Protocol) IPv4   
2 IGMP (Internet Group Management Protocol) IPv4   
4 IPv4 (encapsulated in IPv4) IPv4   
6 TCP (Transmission Control Protocol) IPv4 or IPv6    
17 UDP (User Datagram Protocol) IPv4 or IPv6    







50 Encapsulating Security Payload 
IPv6, Ext. 
Header 5 




58 ICMPv6 IPv6   
59 No Next Header IPv6   
60 Destination Options 
IPv6, Ext. 
Header 2, 7 
 
Hop-by-Hop Options, indicated by next header 0, are intended to be information for 
routers along the path between a source and destination. IP version protocol encapsulation, 
protocol 4, is possible providing support for tunneling through networks. IPv4 packets can be 
encapsulated in IPv4 packets as indicated by protocol code 4. IPv6 packets may be encapsulated 
in IPv4 packets indicated by protocol code 41 [19].  
Transmission Control Protocol or TCP and User Datagram Protocol or UDP transport 
packets can be encapsulated in IPv6 packets just like with IP4 packets. The next header codes 
for TCP and UDP in IPv6 are the same as the protocol codes in IPv4, 6 and 17 respectively. 
Routing headers are specified by code 43 and Fragment headers specified by code 44. 
Encapsulated Security Payload, an encrypted payload is specified by code 50 and authentication 
header, used for authentication and integrity is specified by code 51. 
IPv6 includes a revision to Internet Control Message Protocol or ICMP which can be 
specified by next header 58. Code 59 means that there is no next header and Code 60 provides 
the option for destination options or a kind of “read me first” payload. 
The use of extension headers is still under development and there are many security 
concerns with certain types such as; routing, fragment, and tunnels [20], [15]. Applications 
requiring security of ESP or Authentication headers will drive new requirements for any packet 
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filter firewall rules but in actuality are like Virtual Private Network or VPN features. I expect that 
ordinary network services will use TCP or UDP transport protocols and not extension headers.  
1.4 Security concerns for IPv6 
 “Burdensome” is the term used to describe the task of developing and implementing 
firewall rules for the possible extension headers within IPv6 packets by Caicedo, Joshi, and 
Tuladhar in the 2009 article “IPv6 Security Challenges” [20]. These authors point out the 
requirements for some ICMPv6 messages and the fact that nodes will most likely have multiple 
IPv6 addresses such as link-local, global, and possibly multicast making administration more 
challenging. IPv6 promises opportunity but brings complexity and risk. Transition mechanisms 
such as those described in RFC 2893 will make it possible for IPv6 tunnels to be created over 
existing IPv4 networks [19]. It is important to consider what can be done with IPv6 despite 
these significant security risks. Widespread deployment of IPv6 will require mitigation of these 
issues through trading off features and flexibility.  
1.5 Implications of research 
It is an opportune time to focus on migration approaches to IPv6. Access control will be 
a significant part of any migration or upgrade strategy. There is a need to evaluate firewall 
solutions for effectiveness as enterprises consider making services available on IPv6 networks. 




Operating systems have for many years offered improving levels of support for IPv6 
networking. I expect that host based firewall applications are available that can easily 
apply protocol filtering and address rules to both IPv4 and IPv6 interfaces. 
1.7 Summary 
IPv6 is a protocol designed for the next generation of Internet communication. It comes 
with a simpler format and contains a much larger address capacity necessary for future growth 
of Internet service provisioning.  
IPv6 includes addressing schemes for local, group, any and global Internet 
communications which may reside on the same network interface making managing these 
interface more challenging. IPv6 expands the IP packet payload options by including a series of 
extension headers that cover functions such as intermediate routing, fragmentation, 
confidentiality, authentication, and destination options. IPv6 packets will carry the commonly 
used TCP and UDP packets over existing local area network technologies such as Ethernet. 
The transition to IPv6 will take several years and networked service providers will have 
to support both IPv4 and IPv6. This transition should be straightforward for network services 
that simply migrate from IPv4 to IPv6 networks. I expect that administrators will be able to 
leverage existing firewall rules into new constructs tailored for IPv6. This thesis examines 
packet filter firewalls for systems that will make services available on dual, IPv4/IPv6 stacked 
networks. I will demonstrate the ability of applications to apply address, protocol, and port 
number filtering across IPv4 and IPv6 network interfaces.  
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2 Related work  
Research on IPv6 has moved through various phases from early experimental network 
testing to more recent security issues. Firewall testing with automated means can be found in a 
report from 1999. A method for firewall/routing IPv6 tunnels over IPv4 was published in 2002. 
More recent research has focused on the security of IPv6. I believe the focus on security of IPv6 
in recent years is a leading indicator for eventual widespread IPv6 deployment.  
2.1 “Evaluation and testing of Internet firewalls,” 1999 
Al-Tawil and Al-Kaltham describe an approach to test a firewall using various 
configurations including single and simultaneous testing with attacks coming from within 
neighboring networks or rogue sources [21]. The authors use both automatic and subjective 
means to evaluate two different firewalls. This work provides a methodology for evaluating 
packet filter firewalls that includes variable architectures and an automated packet generation 
tool called Security Administrator's Tool for Analyzing Networks or SATAN. SATAN was used to 
interrogate individual host servers to evaluate packet filter firewall effectiveness.  
2.2 “IPv6 Firewall with OpenBSD,” 2002 
Eric Millican provides instruction on setting up a router/firewall device using Open BSD 
[22] . This is a part tutorial and part “how to” for setting up a gateway that deploys an IPv4 
tunnel to provide connectivity to the global IPv6 network called 6bone. With tunneling, IPv6 
packets are encapsulated inside IPv4 packets and routed to a special destination, called a 
tunnel broker, which unpacks the IPv6 packets from the IPv4 intermediary and passes them to 
the IPv6 network. A variety of tunnel technologies have been developed for IPv6 and are 
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described in RFCs 4213 and 2893 and cover the combinations of Router to Router, Host to 
Router, Host to Host, and Router to Host. These are interesting solutions to connect IPv6 islands 
through existing IPv4 networks.  
Within this publication Millican reviews useful approaches to packet filter firewalling 
including recommendations to; “block all and permit only what is required” as a default policy, 
using logging, stateful TCP filtering, and return of reset error messages to mask the firewall 
presence. Millican includes a list of protocol and ports numbers to explicitly block. This is 
functionally redundant but allows for recording or logging of specific attacks that the firewall 
may encounter. In addition, an administrator can have the extra confidence that a known 
attack is blocked. Packet filter rules are organized by incoming or ingress and outgoing or egress 
rules. Millican includes rules to allow certain ICMPv6 packets, contained in IPv6 packets for 
error reporting, MTU, and neighbor discovery. This is a fairly sophisticated example of a firewall 
that provides tunneling of IPv6 over IPv4 and comprehensive packet filter rules.  
2.3 “IPv6 Packet Filtering,” 2005 
McGann proposes using the flow label of the IPv6 header as an indicator of state in 
support of dynamic firewalls for IPv6 [23] . McGann provides a review of IPv6 and demonstrates 
how the “flow label” within the IPv6 header can be used to indicate state. The objective of this 
proposal is to provide another layer of protection against spoofed IPv6 packets. McGann offers 
a comprehensive review of IPv6, stateless and dynamic packet filtering for both IPv4 and IPv6, 
and a comparison of various packet filter scenarios.  
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2.4 “Packet Filter Algorithm to prevent the security hole of routing header in IPv6,” 2006 
Lim, Kim, and Kim describe the vulnerability introduced with the routing extension 
header, an option for IPv6. They demonstrate a condition where and IP packet can be routed 
around a typical firewall that reads only one, actual destination address [15]. If a routing header 
extension is applied within an IPv6 packet the destination address may represent an 
intermediate destination and not necessary a final address. A routing extension header can 
contain a list of destination addresses with the last one as the real, “final” destination address. 
Lim, Kim, and Kim propose a network firewall algorithm that reads all of the encapsulated 
destination addresses and applies an access control list to them.  
2.5  “Security aspects in IPv6 networks – implementation and testing,” 2007 
Zagar, Grgic, and Rimac-Drlje describe security threats to IPv6 networks such as 
reconnaissance attacks, routing headers, fragment headers denial of service attacks, IPCMv6 
spoofs, the risks of tunnels, and potential holes in dual stack approaches [24]. The authors 
tested the effectiveness of IPv6 firewalls on two systems, Mandrake Linux 10 and Windows XP 
using Network Mapper or nmap, an open source, port, and vulnerability scanner. They also 
simulated an intrusion detection approach using Ethereal, an open source packet capture 
application.  
2.6 “Firewall Design Considerations for IPv6,” 2007 
This document provides an analysis of the possible problems presented by extension 
headers and calls on firewall developers to consider solutions that include more definition to 
address the ambiguity inherent in current IPv6 specifications [25]. Potyraj agrees that the IPv6 
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header will improve intermediate router efficiency but emphasizes the possible obscurity for 
packet filter firewalls due to extension headers. Efficiency improvements as described by 
Potyraj include; removal of checksum, streamlining and fixed size of header, extension header 
approach, and movement fragmentation from router to originator. The vulnerabilities 
introduced by extension headers such as routing, fragmentation options, and tunneling are 
described in detail through various case scenarios. Potyraj offers several recommendations to 
address the vulnerable scenarios possible with IPv6’s extension headers.  
2.7  “Design and Implementation of Distributed Firewall System for IPv6,” 2009 
Lai, Jiang, and Yang describe an approach to use both a network and host firewalls 
working together to provide security in IPv6 systems [26]. Their approach is targeted for IPv6 
packets that contain the Encapsulated Security Payload, or ESP extension header. With IPv6, 
nodes can set up essential virtual private networks or VPNs between themselves by implement 
the ESP header. For IPv6 packets that use ESP, the content of the packet is only understandable 
to the source and destination nodes that have the secret decryption key. This makes firewalls 
unable to inspect packet contents to apply policy or packet filtering criteria since they can only 
see source and destination address on encrypted packets. Lai, Jiang and Yang suggest 
implementation of a dual firewall approach between host and network systems coordinated by 
a central administrative server. Host firewalls inspect decrypted content and pass information 
back to the network firewall and administrative server. Distributed firewall approaches are an 
interesting approach considering the new security threats presented by IPv6 and especially 
encrypted packets.  
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2.8 “Guidelines on Firewalls and Firewall Policy,” 2009 
Scarfone and Hoffman from the National Institute of Standards published a guideline for 
firewalls [11]. This is a revision of a 2002 document which provides a comprehensive practical 
tutorial and guide for the development of policy and firewall systems. The 2009, revision 1 
Guidelines includes a section on recommendations for IPv6 which recommends that; IPv6 
firewalls have the same rules available as with IPv4; that tools offer a cloning rule feature to 
ease the process of making IPv6 filtering rules from existing IPv4 rules, provide capability for 
managing ICMPv6 content, and a means to filter IPv6 tunnels over IPv4.  
2.9 “IPv6 support in firewalls,” 2009 
Håkan Lindberg and Tomas Gilså of the .SE, the organization that coordinates Sweden’s 
top level domain, tested a variety of firewall appliance devices for IPv6 in both 2008 and 2009 
[27]. Their tests in 2008 involved only an IPv6 environment whereas the tests in 2009 included 
test with both IPv4 and IPv6 servers. Their testing included multiple sessions and file sizes from 
the same IP address for the firewall under test. They used download time as an indication of 
the firewall device’s ability to process or filter the packet flows. For the six devices tested in 
2009 their conclusions were that in general the firewall devices offered comparable features 
and performance for either IPv4 or IPv6 networking.  
2.10  Summary 
Research on IPv6 firewalls has covered the span of configurations for experimental 
systems, solutions for security threats and performance evaluation. Firewalling for IPv6 will be 
more challenging considering the threats posed by extension headers and need for ICMPv6. 
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Past work confirms support within operating systems for packet filter firewalls and 
demonstrates many of the functionalities that firewall design should include. The opportunity 
exists for more research on firewalls with IPv6, particularly for packet filter applications for dual 




3 Approach and Methodology 
Various organizations have developed approaches to testing and certifying firewall 
effectiveness. This allows for more confidence in their effectiveness and standard practices in 
the industry. Common Criteria and ICSA labs provide guidelines from which I derive criteria for 
my research.  
3.1 Common Criteria 
The “Common Criteria” (or CC) and “Common Evaluation Methodology for Information 
Technology Security Evaluation” (or CEM) are the basis for an international agreement called 
“The Common Criteria Recognition Agreement” (or CCRA). The CCRA maintains, “The Common 
Criteria,” “Common Evaluation Methodology,” related documentation, a registry of certified 
independent laboratories, database of “Protection Profiles,” and a listing of certified products 
[28].  
The “Common Criteria” is described by three parts in three documents. The first 
document/part is called “Introduction and General Model” and mentions that a Firewall may be 
a Target of Evaluation (or TOE) and may be used as a counter-measure [29]. The second 
document/part, “Security Functionality Requirements” provides very broad requirements for 
authentication, auditing, cryptography, and access controls. Firewalls are mentioned to be used 
for IP packet flows or addresses with external interfaces [30]. The third document/part 
“Security Evaluation Requirements,” mentions a firewall as a possible TOE and describes the 
need to provide consideration of physical location, access, power and interface considerations 
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[31]. It also defines “Evaluation Assurance Levels” or EALs. These are used to rate the security 
level of the computer security product. 
A document called, “Common, Evaluation Methodology” (CEM) provides guidance for; 
TOE testing, the development of “Protection Profiles” and reporting of test results [32]. The 
“Firewall Protection Profile” provides specific description of security threats that a firewall 
should address [33]. 
Table 5. Threats listed in the “Firewall Protection Profile” [33] 
Threat Description 
1. Address spoofing 
The ability or threat of an external or internal node to 
use a ‘fake’ or unassigned IP address 
2. Continuous 
Authentication Attempts 
The ability or threat of an external node to repeatedly 
attempt to access internal resources, e.g., login  
3. Illegal Information Inflow 
The act of illicit information coming from an external 
source 
4. Illegal Information 
Outflow 
The act of information coming from an internal source to 
an external destination that is not authorized or allowed 
5. Impersonation 
The threat of an external entity masquerading as an 
authorized user 
6. Recording Failure 
The threat of an external source exhausting the firewalls 
ability to record events 
7. Replay Attack 
The threat of an external source intercepting and 
replaying a valid authentication sequence 
8. Stored Data Damage 
The threat that an unauthorized external force may 
tamper with the record of events recorded by a firewall 
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3.2 ICSA Labs Network Firewall Testing Criteria 
ICSA Labs offers certifications specifically for firewalls, intrusion detection, virus, and 
spyware related products. ICSA describes itself as “providing credible, independent, 3rd party 
product assurance for end users and enterprises” [34].  
The Modular Firewall Certification Criteria, Baseline module – version 4.1 published by 
the ICSA provides a set of requirements that are described in Table 6 [35] which are relevant to 
research on firewall effectiveness.  
Table 6. Categories of Criteria from ICSA “Modular Firewall Certification Criteria” [35] 
Category Description 
1. Logging Firewalls ability to record certain events and details 
2. Administration Ability to configure settings or functions 
3. Persistence Level of resiliency when power is lost and reapplied 
4. Functional Testing 
Tests enforcement of security policy and administrative 
functionality under “normal” operating conditions  
5. Security Testing 
Evaluation of the security of the device; including administrative 
access, vulnerability, denial of service and fragment testing 
6. Documentation 
Installation, Administration (operation/maintenance), Support 
documents 
 
Like the Common Criteria, the Modular Firewall Certification Criteria are comprehensive 
and targeted at network firewall appliances.  
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3.3 A criteria for evaluating the effectiveness of packet filter firewall applications 
 “The Common Criteria” and the ICSA publications a comprehensive basis for the 
evaluation of firewall devices from which I can take a subset of criteria for evaluating packet 
filters, namely “Illegal Inflows” from the Common Criteria and “Functional” aspects from the 
ICSA. Packet filtering is one function of a firewall device and a primary means of determining 
illegal inflows or outflows based on packet characteristics. In order to objectively evaluate 
packet filter firewalls in a dual stacked environment, I developed the following qualitative 
criteria. 
Table 7. Snyder’s criteria for evaluating “dual stack” Internet Protocol firewall applications 
1. What operating system does the application require or is it a part of? 
2. What is the user interface? 
3. What IPv4 packet parameters can be filtered? 
4. What IPv6 packet parameters can be filtered?  
5. Can the tool generate IPv4 and IPv6 packet filter rules automatically or 
simultaneously? 
6. Does the resulting firewall allow packets designated as permissible through? 
7. Does the resulting firewall block packets designated as inappropriate? 
8. Can the firewall be configured to “permit all” and “block all” states? 
9. Can state, meaning tracking over time, for certain IP packets be specified? 
10. Can the application create packet filters rules for extension headers?  




My first two criteria relate to the operating system and user interface for the packet 
filter application under test. The next few criteria relate to the filtering features and how 
automatically they can be applied across both IPv4 and IPv6 interfaces. The next few criteria ask 
how effective the packet filter firewall, created by the application under test, is at allowing and 
blocking certain IP packets as well as switching to a “permit all” and “block all” states. The last 
few points ask about the application under test’s ability to deal with tracking of connection 
state, extension headers (for IPv6 only) and description of the ease of use for developing and 
deploying the packet filter firewall.  
3.4 Summary 
The Common Criteria’s Firewall Protection Profile and the ICSA’s Modular Firewall 
Certification Criteria provide a comprehensive background by which to consider packet filter 
firewall applications. From each of these publications, I have chosen to focus on “Illegal 
Information Inflows/Outflows,” through unauthorized connections and “Functional Testing,” 
meaning to test the packet filter firewall work as designed. I have summarized my criteria for 
evaluation in table 7 which covers operating system, packet filter features, functionality, and 





I tested two different systems for their ability to create and deploy packet filter firewalls 
for IPv4 and IPv6 networking against the previously described criteria.  
4.1 Experimental system and packet filter firewall applications under test 
I used the following test platform to conduct my experiments. 
 
Figure 3. Experimental system  
 
The experimental system consists of an “Observer Host” workstation” networked to two 
different “Server Host” workstations. The “Observer Host” ran an application called nmap, an 
open source port scanning tool [36], which was used to connect to services running on each 
server in a manner consistent with how a “client” computer might connect to a “server” 
through the Internet. Each server will be protected by each packet filter firewall that will be 
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configured by a different host application to allow access to certain running services while 
blocking others.  
The system was built using a physical, laptop workstation running two other hosts inside 
VMware Workstation 6.5.1. The real laptop system functioned as the “Observer Host” and two 
virtual systems “Server Hosts” were deployed and connected using the VMware virtual 
networking. Initial tests confirmed that the virtual Ethernet networking inside VMware 
Workstation 6.5.1 supported both IPv4 and IPv6 addresses. For one server host I chose Fedora 
Core 10 and for the other I chose Windows Server 2008. Both operating systems support dual 
stack IPv4, IPv6 networking and come with applications for packet filter firewalling. 
4.1.1 system-config-iptables in Fedora Core 10 
Fedora Core 10 is an open source, Linux operating system that is offered by Red Hat Inc. 
Support for IPv4 has been included since it began and support for IPv6 has been included since 
Fedora Core 6 [37]. The “system-config-firewall” is a graphical user interface tool within Fedora 
Core operating systems which provides basic configuration of firewall rules [38].  System-config-
firewall creates configuration files for “iptables” which are used by “netfilter” the network 
portion of the Linux kernel. 
4.1.2 Windows Firewall with Advanced Security in Windows Server 2008 
Windows Server 2008 is a server based operating system from Microsoft that supports 
dual stack IPv4, IPv6 networking [39], [40]. It is designed for running networked services such as 
web servers. Windows Firewall with Advanced Security is an application offered with Windows 
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Server ® 2008 R2 operating system that blocks incoming or outgoing connections based on the 
configuration of a rule set [41]. 
4.2 Scope and firewall test application  
I limited the scope of testing and selected a subset of all the possible combinations of IP 
addresses, protocol and port numbers. For IP addresses, I chose to work with each host’s link-
local address since these were configured by default and I had no router in my experimental 
system.  
4.2.1 Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) 
The choice of transmission control protocol is important because each comes with 
certain expectations or assumptions when it comes to testing an IP protocol and packet filter 
firewall. I chose to work with TCP (transmission control protocol) because it is very common 
and can be encapsulated with both IPv4 and IPv6 protocols. TCP is used in file exchanges and 
hyper text protocol (http) for web pages where assurance in data transfer is required. TCP 
payloads offer an advantage when it comes to firewall testing since it assumes a formal dialog 
process to establish and maintain communication. Other transport protocols, such as User 
Datagram Protocol or UDP, send data without this formal exchange or verification process. 
TCP is characterized by a “three way handshake” that begins and ends each data 
exchange. A “server” process will listen on a given port number for any initiating “syn” TCP 
packet on the network. The server then replies with a “syn acknowledgement” and a sequence 
number. The requesting node then acknowledges the acknowledgement before sending data in 
segments which are also acknowledged periodically. Data exchange between two nodes then 
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ends with a closing three way handshake described in figure 4. TCP provides a high level of 
certainty that messages are sent and received. The “syn” message starts the conversation 
between the two computers.  
 
Figure 4. TCP’s “three way handshake” process 
 
4.2.2 Modeling the TCP/IP packet filtering process 
A packet filter will inspect specific attributes for any incoming IP packet and either allow 
or reject that packet to pass the boundary defined by the firewall.  An IPv6 packet with TCP 




Figure 5. An IPv6 packet with a TCP protocol payload 
 
A basic packet filter will inspect the following header fields; Next Header for the 
protocol designation of the payload, Source, Destination IP Address, and within the TCP data 
payload, the source and destination port number. State-full packet filters may look at sequence, 
acknowledgement, as well as control bits and window size and compare this to past 
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Figure 6. Modeling firewall operation 
 
It is possible to model the process of one computer connecting to another with a packet 
filter firewall in place. A client sends an IP packet/message to a destination, a server in this 
case, through the network. The packet is addressed to the server’s port 80 and contains a TCP 
protocol payload. The network interface on the server receives this packet and passes it to the 
firewall. The firewall reads the source and destination IP addresses protocol, and source and 
destination port numbers. It compares these to a list of allow and deny rules. If the packet is 
allowed it is permitted to pass to the host and handed off to the “listening socket” (a computer 
process/program in a wait mode) corresponding to the destination port number. If the packet is 
“not allowed” it is dropped and an ICMP error message may be sent back to the requesting 
client.  
This type of filtration is called ingress filtering since it deals with incoming IP packets. 
Outgoing packet filtration is also possible, called egress, and is useful to manage access of the 
host computers within a group to destinations or nodes on the Internet.  
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4.2.3 Port number assumptions 
Each IP address may have one or more ports available with a certain transport protocol 
assumed. Ports and transport protocol are the technology that computer applications use to 
transfer data across the Internet. There are 65,536 ports possible and popular transport 
protocols include TCP and UDP. Table 8 describes popular port numbers, protocol, and the 
applications or services associated with each summarized from Forouzan [42] . 
Table 8. Well known port numbers used with TCP transport protocol 
Port Protocol Description 
20 FTP File Transfer Protocol, data 
21 FTP File Transfer Protocol, control 
22 Telnet Terminal Network 
25 SMTP Simple Mail Transfer Protocol 
53 DNS Domain Name Server 
67 BOOTP Bootstrap Protocol 
  DHCP Dynamic Host Configuration 
Protocol 
80 HTTP Hypertext Transfer Protocol 
111 RPC Remote Procedure Call 
433 HTTPS HTTP over Secure Sockets Layer 
 
4.2.4 Port scanning/connectivity tool - Nmap 
Nmap is an open source port scanning test application which can generate a “syn” 
message addressed to any port on a given server and attempt to connect to any listening 
process that may or may not be behind a firewall [36]. Based on the response received to this 
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initial “syn” message, nmap figures out whether or not a firewall is in place and whether or not 
a given port is accessible. My research indicated that nmap had IPv6 capabilities [24]. In my 
testing I put nmap on the “Observer Host” and used it to send a series of “syn” messages to a 
wide range of port numbers to check each server. Nmap makes a determination to the status of 
each port based on the response to each “syn” message that it sends to a given host. A 
summary of the possible responses and a description of their meaning is enclosed in the 
following table. 







… port is description 
syn + ack open  
host is up, port open and 
listening 
reset closed 
host is up, no application on 
port 




firewall filtered and set to no 
response or host is down 
 
I actually used “Zenmap” which is a graphical interface with nmap inside. In my results 
section the screen captures are from “Zenmap,” but the images have been cropped to leave 
only the “nmap” portion. 
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4.3 Experimental Steps 
My experimental procedure consisted of six parts; install and configure a “Server Host” 
system, deploy a packet filter firewall using the application under test, confirm listening 
services on the host server, then test the firewall in three states: “as designed,” “permit all,” 
and “block all” using nmap port scanning.  
4.3.1 Install and configure “Server Host” system 
Operating systems were installed on each virtual host computer system following 
guidelines provided with the intent of creating a web server with remote login and adding four 
custom netcat processes. I installed services on each server host for Internet web server and 
remote login access capabilities. On each server I also installed and then ran four instances of 
the application “netcat.” “Netcat” is an open source tool for either Windows or Linux that can 
function as a client or server using TCP on either IPv4 or IPv6 addresses [43]. Two “netcat” 
servers were installed and bound to server’s IPv4 address and two were installed and bound to 
the server’s IPv6 address. The plan was that one of each IP version of the netcat process would 
be blocked by the firewall and the other allowed. 
4.3.2 Deploy a packet filter firewall using the “application under test” 
I created and deployed a packet filter firewall on each server using the “application 
under test.” The design goal was that each server would be a web server with secure remote 
access capability. I also added access for two custom services; one bound to an IPv4 address 
and one bound to an IPv6 address. 
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4.3.3 Confirm listening services on “Server Host” 
To display all the running and listening services on each server I used “netstat.” 
“Netstat” is a command line tool available on either Windows or Linux that displays lists of 
running networked processes, their mode, e.g., “listening,” and the IP address and port number 
that they are bound and recently connected to (a external/foreign IP address). 
4.3.4 Connectivity of “Server Host” with firewall “as designed” 
After the firewall was deployed on each “Server Host,” it was tested using nmap from 
the “Observer Host.” Nmap sent a series of “syn” messages to the ports on each the server 
hosts and interprets the response.  
4.3.5 Connectivity of “Server Host” with firewall in “accept all” and “block all” 
To be sure the firewall was actually running the designed firewall state; two other 
firewall states were included in my testing process, “accept all” and “block all.” “Accept all” 
provided verification for “netstat,” meaning the “observer host” should see all the listening 
processes on the server. “Block All” confirmed the firewall’s ability to shut down the interface 
to any network connection.  
After running the “block all” state, the firewall was restored to its “as designed “state 





5.1 System-config-firewall/iptables on Fedora Core 10/Linux 
My first test case was with “system-config-firewall” and “iptables” using Fedora Core 10 
a Linux based operating system.  
5.1.1  “Server Host” and “Observer Host” configuration 
I installed and configured a “server host” using Fedora Core 10, Kernel Linux 2.6.27.41-
170.2.117.fc10.i686 runing inside VMWare© Workstation 6.5.1 build-126130. I also installed 
and configured to run at boot the following services: secure shell (ssh/22), domain name 
service (dns/53, light-weight dns, dnsmasq) and Apache web server (http/80, https/443). I 
installed netcat and added four Netcat services, 2 IPv4 and 2 IPv6 by typing the following 
commands: “nc – 4 –l 741&, nc – 4 –l 742&, nc – 6 –l 761&, nc – 6 –l 762&.” I also experimented 
briefly with the service “sendmail.” It was installed but it was configured to a local host address, 
meaning it would not be addressable through a networked IP address.  
The server host received its IPv4 address from a DHCP server running inside the VMware 
ethernet and was IP addresses: Ipv4: 192.168.100.130. Fedora Core 10 will automatically 
configure an IPv6 address on its interfaces using a generic prefix and the interface’s MAC 
address. The link-local address for the Server host was IPv6: fe80::20c:29ff:fe7b:eb64. 
The observer host ran Windows Vista ™ Home Premium, © 2007 Microsoft Corporation, 
Service Pack 2, Dell – Inspiron 1525, Intel® Core™2 Duo CPU T5800 @ 2.00GHz. The observer 
hosts interface used Local Area Connection 3: IPv4: 192.168.100.1, obtained from VMWare. The 
 
oberserver host obtained a link-local address of IPv6: fe80::106c:f7c9:b2f3:9019%16 by self 
autoconfiguration. 
5.1.2 Creating a packet filter firewall using “system
I launched system-config
control panel. I was presented with the following screen. 
Figure 7. “Trusted Services” window, system
 
From the “Trusted Services” 
allow through the packet filter firewall.
port numbers 53. For my testing I ignored UDP ports as they are more complex 
included sendmail (port 25/tcp) 
be filtered, but there will not be an
was able to select web services ssh/22 and 
From the “Other Ports” screen, I entered access for 
e.g., ports 742 and 762. The application assigned a service name to these ports which is not 
accurate for my case but probably comes from the IANA port assignment
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-config-firewall” 




window I was able to select the service which I wanted to 
 By selecting DNS, I received both TCP and UDP protocol 
to test “closed” port detection capability of nmap. Port 25 will 
 active process bound to either IPv4 or IPv6 addreses
http/80 from the “Trusted Services”
two of my four netcat
 listing
to test. I 
. Also, I 
 window. 
 processes, 
 [44].  
 
Figure 8. “Other Ports” window, system
 
 Lastly, I looked at the ICMP Filter screen since 
especially ping so I could verify connectivity. 
Figure 9. “ICMP Filter,” system-config firewall
 
The “ICMP Filter” window was the first time I was presented with any information that 
indicated this tool would affect both IPv4 and IPv6 packet filtering.
check items for the firewall to reject.
clicked on “Apply” which saves these settings to 








 This screen allowed 
 I left them all unchecked. After making these settings I 




This user interface is straightforward and convenient but I discovered two major 
problems. System-config-firewall creates a ruleset with two lines that severly compromise 
firewall effectiveness. One line allows established connection packets to pass the firewall and a 
second line allows ALL packets to pass the firewall. This problem was only discovered after 
careful analysis of the configuration file created by system-config-firewall and review of how 
the underlying “iptables” commands work. The details of this problem and my corrective action 
to remove these lines are described in Appendix A.  
Another significant issue with this tool was trying to understand the relationship it had 
to the system and other command line tools like “service” and “iptables.” I ended up creating a 
system state diagram in oder to have a comprehensive picture of how the various elements 
went together which is also in Appendix A.  
5.1.2.1 Displaying the active packet filter rules created by system-config-firewall 
Displaying the firewall rules created by system-config-firewall is accomplished within a 
terminal window using the command line “service iptables status” for IPv4 and “service 
ip6tables status” for the IPv6 tables. The following two figures describe what I observed.  
 
Figure 10. Output from "service iptables status," Fedora Core 
 
Figure 11. Output from "service ip6tables status," Fedora Core 
The columns of information displayed show the rule number, the target (which is 
another name for the resulting action that will occur if the criteria in the rule is true), the 
protocol of the incoming packet, 





the source IP address (which in this case is any IPv4 




 address), a 
 
connection state. (e.g., NEW tcp) , with the specified destination port number.
allows ICMP packets to be accepted on this server host.
services I selected in system-config
reject rule and was created by system
fails to match up with any of the previous rules.
firewall will not block any packets.
sent back to the destination if such a packet is detected or dropped.
that a firewall is in place. The ip6tables display is almost identical to the IPv4 versio
address specifications are for IPv6.
also may be created. In this case, system
as this is used by the DNS application in addition to TCP. 
5.1.3 Confirming listening services on Fedora Core 10, “Server Host”
I ran “netstat –napt” to observe the listening processes 
that are using networked connections.
of all processes using tcp transport protocol and their associate process id number. 
Figure 12. Inventory of listening services, Fedora Core 
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 The first rule 
 Rules 2 through 8 correspond to the 
-firewall. The last rule in this list, number 9, is the default 
-config-firewall. It will be applied if the incoming packet 
 This is a critical rule since if it is not present the 
 This “reject” rule specifices that an ICMP error messsage be 
 This is often 
 Both iptables and ip6tables displays any UDP rules which 
-config-firewall created firewall rules for UDP port 53 
 
 
or services for this server host 
 The options I used for this tool provide numeric display 
 
a telltale sign 





This output includes for each listening port a description of; protocol, receive/send 
statistics, local IP address/port number, foreign IP address, connection state, the process 
identification number or PID, and the process name. For example, the first line shows port 
number 741 bound to ip address 0.0.0.0 connected to foreign network address 0.0.0.0 at any 
port, in a “LISTEN” state, with PID 5539 and name process name“nc.” The “0.0.0.0” IP address 
specification is a default applied when processes are running on a host but actual connections 
have not occurred. When acutal connections occur, the 0.0.0.0 or default IP address 
specification will change to reflect the actual IP address.  
The display of listening processes from netstat was as I expected. It was interesting that 
some services, e.g., dns and sshd, ports automatically bound themselves to both an IPv4 and 
IPv6 address. I was expecting Apache to listen on IPv4 ports 80 and 433 but running processes 
were not displayed. Perhaps these processes wake up after they are called. I was pleased to see 
the processes and ports that I added by running netcat, e.g., 741,742, 762, and 762. I also 
observed two processes running were bound to local host addresses, e.g., 127.0.0.0. These 
include “sendmail”, an email processes and “cuspd”, a networked printing process. These 
processes should remain undetectable through any externally networked interface. I was also 
surprise to see the process called “rpcbind” running on this server host. This is a file sharing or 
network configuration process that I must have installed by default. 
5.1.4 Connectivity of Fedora Core 10 server with firewall “as designed” 
I ran nmap to both IPv4 and IPv6 addresses on the Fedora Core 10, server host. This had 
to be done in two steps since nmap only works with one IP address version at a time. I explicitly 
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specified –sS for a syn scan and port range 1-1024. If I did not explicitly specify a port range, 
nmap would jump around in an apparent attempt to find the most likely open ports. Instead, I 
wanted nmap to make a sequential scan of port numbers, so I specified a specific range. The 
first round of results are shown in figure 13.  
 
Figure 13. Port scan results of IPv4 address, Fedora Core “Server Host” 
 
This agrees with my expectations given the firewall settings and listening ports. The 
firewall seems to have provided acess to the ports I specified and “filtered” or blocked all 
others. Port 80 was picked up as an open port even though it was not in the netstat process 
display . I was not expecting to see an open port on the IPv4 address for port 762. Netstat did 
not report a running process bound to an IPv4 address for port 762. The option I used to invoke 
netcat, e.g., nc – 6 –l 762&, appears to have created a process and bound it to both IPv4 and 
IPv6 interfaces. 
I ran the same port range but used the IPv6 address for the server. I had to switch to a –
sT scan type with nmap. Apparently with IPv6, nmap is not allowed to write raw IP packets as 
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the “–sS” option specifies. Instead the “-sT” option involves the host operating system to 
generate the IPv6 packet.  
 
Figure 14. Port scan results of IPv6 address, Fedora Core “Server Host”, part a 
 
This result was as I expected for all running processes bound to IPv6 addresses and 
given the firewall configuration. However, I ran this a second time and recieved the folllowing 
results.  
 
Figure 15. Port scan results of IPv6 address, Fedora Core “Sever Host,” part b 
 
 
In this trial, port 25 does not show up.
detecting closed ports, especially with the 
times and witnessed the same results. 
5.1.5 Connectivity of Fedora Core 10 “Server Host” 
In order to verify that the firewall I designed was actually working I wanted to test the 
case where the firewall was effectively disabled.
bound to either IPv4 or IPv6 addresses and listening for a connection. I stopped
IPv6 firewalls using the “service” tool.
through or to “accept all.” It is as If the firewall is not there.
visible to a nmap scan. For this step I ran service iptables stop and service ip6tables stop.
Figure 16. Results of “service iptables stop,” Fedora Core “Server Host”
 
Figure 17. Results of “service ip6tables stop,” Fedora Core "Server Host"
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 This may be a result of the uncertainty around 
–sT option with nmap. I repeated this test several 
 
with firewall “accept all”
 In this case nmap should detect all processes 
 This places the firewall in a state that allo











Figure 18 describes the results from nmap scan on the server host’s IPv4 address. 
 
Figure 18. Port scan results of IPv4 address, “permit all” fw, Fedora Core "Server Host" 
 
This time nmap discovered all the previous ports plus 111, 443, 761 and 762. This 
confirmed that when netcat is run with the “-6”option that it actually creates “dual stacked” 
process, meaning processes bound to both IPv6 and IPv4 addresses. I had originally assumed 
the netcat with the “-6” option would bind a process only an IPv6 address. I could also see that 
the Apache, httpd processes (bound to ports 80 and 443) were open when the firewall was set 
to accept all. This means these processes must “wake up” when given a “syn” command, even 
though they were not displayed by netstat. 
I ran nmap from the client/observer host to the server host’s IPv6 address. 
 
 
Figure 19. Port scan results of IPv6 addresses, “permit all” fw, Fedora Core "Server Host"
 
All listening IPv6 ports are open as expected based on the proesses that were running 
and the firewall rules as I designed 
5.1.6 Connectivity of Fedora Core 10 server 
I set the IPv4 and IPv6 firewalls to “ block all” incoming packets. This is accomplished by 
issuing the “service iptables panic” and “service ip6tables panic




them. All other ports are closed.  
with firewall “block all” 





Figure 21. Results of “service ip6tables panic”
 
With the firewall in “block all” state, I
of the server host and observed the following resutls. 
Figure 22. Port scan results of IPv4 address, “block all,” Fedora Core “Server Host”
 
Figure 23. Port scan results of IPv6 address, “block all,” Fedora Core “Server Host”
 
I also tried “nmap –PN –p1













host firewall and never replied to. After several minutes of observing these inconclusive 
attempts by nmap, I stopped nmap execution manually .  
 
Figure 24. PING port scan results of IPv6 address, “block all,” Fedora Core “Server Host” 
 
Wireshark ™, an open source protocol analysys tool, reveals that nmap sends a series of 
ICMPv6 messages (Neighbor solicitation) expecting a reply [45]. Since all ports are set to 
“DROP”, no reply is ever given. This means the firewall is dropping all as expected. Nmap 
interprets this as a down system. 
 
Figure 25. Output from “wireshark” while running “nmap –PN” 
 
Lastly, I reloaded the designed firewall and confirmed its operation. 
5.1.7 Summarizing results, “system-config-firewall/iptables” 
One of the significant challenges of evaluating results was in developing a method to 
effectively compare running processes, firewall design or state and the port scanning results.  
Each tool used reported results in slightly different order making a systematic comparison 
difficult.  When results were reorder, firewall effectiveness could be evaluated. Table 10 
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summarizes the design and test results I achieved with Fedora Core 10 and system-config-
firewall. 
Table 10. Summary of results, “system-config-firewall/iptables” 
 
The rows of Table 10 are organized by port number using the display from “iptables-
status” as the guide. The first major grouping of column shows the processes that were running 
on the host server as displayed by the tool netstat. The next major column grouping shows 
details about the firewall that was designed. The third major column grouping shows the results 
of port scanning with nmap. Next are columns showing the firewall in “accept all” and “block 
all” states and the corresponding results from nmap scanning.  
With this format, I could examine the results for each process and it’s corresponding 
port number. For services bound to the Server Host’s IPv4 address; a “dnsmasq” process was 
firewall firewall
accept all block all
  
proto local addr. foreign ad. state port process rule target proto IP sourc IP dest state dport port status target port status target port status
IPv4 IPv4
1 accept icmp 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 na na
tcp 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 LISTEN 53 dnsmasq 2/3 accept tcp/udp 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 NEW 53 53 open 53 open
tcp 127.0.0.1 0.0.0.0 LISTEN 25 sendmail 4 accept tcp 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 NEW 25 25 closed
tcp 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 LISTEN 22 sshd 5 accept tcp 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 NEW 22 22 open 22 open
tcp 80 http 6 accept tcp 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 NEW 80 80 open 80 open
tcp 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 LISTEN 742 nc 7 accept tcp 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 NEW 742 742 open 742 open
tcp 762 nc 8 accept tcp 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 NEW 762 762 open 762 open
tcp 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 LISTEN 111 rpcbind 9 reject tcp 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 111 open
tcp 443 httpd 9 reject tcp 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 443 open
tcp 127.0.0.1 0.0.0.0 LISTEN 631 cuspd na
tcp 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 LISTEN 741 nc 9 reject tcp 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 741 open
tcp 761 nc 9 reject tcp 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 761 open
IPv6 IPv6
1 accept icmpv6 :: :: na na
tcp :: :: LISTEN 53 dnsmasq 2/3 accept tcp/udp :: :: NEW 53 53 open 53 open
tcp 25 sendmail 4 accept tcp :: :: NEW 25 25 closed?
tcp :: :: LISTEN 22 sshd 5 accept tcp :: :: NEW 22 22 open 22 open
tcp :: :: LISTEN 80 httpd 6 accept tcp :: :: NEW 80 80 open 80 open
tcp 742 nc 7 accept tcp :: :: NEW 742
tcp :: :: LISTEN 762 nc 8 accept tcp :: :: NEW 762 762 open 762 open
tcp :: :: LISTEN 111 rpcbind 9 reject tcp :: :: 111 open
tcp :: :: LISTEN 443 httspd 9 reject tcp :: :: 443 open
tcp ::1 :: LISTEN 631 cuspd na












































127.0.0.0 local addr is not applicable
IPv4 IPv4




no process reported by nstat
no process reported by nstat
no process reported by nstat
no process reported by nstat
no process reported by nstat






running on port number 53, set to be accepted by the firewall and was reported as open by 
nmap. A “sendmail” process was running but bound to the local host address, was set to be 
accepted by the firewall and detected as closed by nmap (which means according to nmap is 
was not a running process on the sever host.). A “sshd” process was running, configured to be 
accepted by the firewall and detected as open by nmap. Netstat did not report a “http” process 
on port 80 but a firewall rule of accept was established and an open port 80 was detected by 
nmap. A process on port 742 was detected by netstat, configured to be accepted by the firewall 
and reported as open by nmap. No process on port 762 was detected by netstat, a firewall rule 
was created for this port number, unknowingly, and port 762 was reported open by nmap.  
For the processes bound to the IPv4 address with the firewall “as designed” there were 
4 ports I expected to be open and I detected 5. The “extra” process came from running netcat 
with the -6 option. When the firewall was configured to “accept all” and “block all” states the 
results from the IPv4 interface were as expected.  
The results from the IPv6 interface on the Fedora Core 10 “Server Host” were exactly as 
expected. I expected 4 ports open and 1 port closed and that is what I observed. Process 
“dnsmasq” was listening on port 53, set to be accepted by the firewall and was reported as 
open by nmap. Process “sendmail” was not reported by netstat, a firewall accept rule was 
created and nmap reported this port as closed or filtered. Processes “sshd,” “httpd,” and “nc,” 
were running on ports 22, 80, and 762 respectively, allowed by the firewall and detected as 




The packet filter firewall designed in system-config-firewall performed as expected after 
its operation understood and the resulting configuration file was repaired using iptables. The 
tool automatically created both packet filters for IPv4 and IPv6 network interfaces and was a 
convenient starting place to create an effective packet filter firewall.  
5.2 Windows Firewall with Advanced Security  
Windows has supported IPv6 for several years with features and capabilities increasing 
with every new Windows release. With Windows Vista, dual stack support was configured by 
default.  
5.2.1  “Sever Host,” Windows Server 2008 configuration 
I installed and configured a server host with Windows Server ©Standard, © 2007 
Microsoft Corporation, Service Pack 1 running inside VMWare© Workstation 6.5.1 build-
126130. As part of the system installation, I chose options for a web and remote desktop 
services. I installed and ran netcat, to provide four more services on this host ( 2 IPv4, and 2 
IPv6). e.g., Nc -1 -p741, nc –l –p742, nc6 –l –p761, nc6 –l –p762.  
The server host IP addresses were: Ipv4: 192.168.100.131 and IPv6: 
fe80::9436:8604:accf:fd76. The IPv4 address was obtained from the dhcp service running in 
VMware. Windows 2008 automatically configures the link local IPv6 address. The observer host 
was the same Windows Vista laptop as described in section 5.1.1.  
5.2.2 Creating a packet filter firewall using Windows Firewall with Advanced Security 
Windows Firewall with Advanced security is a graphical user interface for a set of 
firewall rules applicable to a given server. The user interface can be accessed by the control 
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panel or program listing interface. Several default rules are provided and the interface provides 
tools to manage the view of these various configurations. Rules are organized under three 
profiles; domain, private, and public. Each profile offers general rules on how to handle, e.g., 
block or allow, default incoming, outgoing, and secure connections.  
 
Figure 26. Inbound rules window, “Windows Firewall with Advanced Security” 
 
Firewall rules were also created automatically when I installed the web service and 
remote desktop services as part of the system instalation process. Rules for port numbers 3389 
and 80 are included in figure 26 and correspond to the services remote desktop and web 
server. This figure also describes firewall “Allow” rules for port numbers 139, 445, Dynamic RPC, 
2869, 5357 and 5338. I did not expect these nor did I completely understand their significance. 
They must have been installed during system installation/configuration or by default. For my 
experiement I decided to include them. I added a custom rule to provided access to tcp 
protocol and ports 742 and 762 and figure 27 shows two tabbed views of the properties 




Figure 27. Properties window, “netcat_allow” rule 
 
If you click on any of the rules a series of windows, e.g properties are revealed by which 
various rule parameters can be set. There were predefined protocols unique to IPv6 like 
ICMPv6, fragment, and routing headers. I could not find settings to filter based on TCP state. 
 I observed that when a packet was blocked, Windows Firewall with Advanced Security 
did not send back an ICMP error coded message. It appeared to drop the packet. Nmap 
classified this response as “filtered.” I could not find a parameter that would allow me to 
configure the ICMP or ICMPv6 response message to a blocked request. There were 
preconfigured rules to allow this sever to respond to ICMP/ICMPv6 “ping “ requests.  
Details of my experience with Windows Firewall with Advanced Security are included in 




5.2.3 Confirming listening services on Windows Server 2008 
I ran netstat –anp TCP to observe the listening ports on this server host. Figure 28 
contains a summary of the listening TCP ports on the Windows Server 2008.  
 
Figure 28. Output , “netstat -anp TCP” and “netstat -anp TCPv6” 
 
This output of netstat is not as detail rich as the version run on Fedora Core 10 but it is 
adequate. An observation about Windows Server 2008 is that it launched several services 
related to file sharing and networking. These are probably a result of choices I unknowingly 
made during the installation process. These “file sharing and netwoking” processes included 
processes bound to; port 139 (NetBIOS), port 445 (SMB, server message block), port 135( end 
point map/RPC), 5357 (network discovery) and 49152-49157 (dynamic rpc). These are all 
consistent with firewall rules previously reported except there is no process listening on port 
2869. Ports 741 and 742 are active and bound to interface’s IPv4 address and ports 761 and 762 
are bound to the interface’s IPv6 address. 
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5.2.4 Connectivity of Windows Server 2008 with firewall “as designed” 
From the observer host, I used nmap to interogate both the IPv4 and IPv6 addresses on 
the Windows Server 2008. In order to get consistent and timely results I had to explicitly specify 
port ranges for scanning. If I ran nmap with the entire range at once, e.g., 1-50,000, nmap 
would miss some of the ports and services that I had running and it took a long time to 
complete. I broke the entire port range down to three regions that would include the listening 
service port numbers. The port ranges I used were: 1-1024, 3000-6000, and 48,000-50,000. 






Figure 29. Port scan results of IPv4 address, Windows 2008 Server “Server Host” 
 
These results agree with my expectations based on my design of the firewall for the 
Windows Server 2008 host. The listening service on port 741 has been filtered or shielded by 
the firewall. All of the dynamic RPC ports, numbers 49152 … , were filtered ports. The firewall is 
allowing the file sharing and networking services which I observed from the netstat output 
including; ports 139 (NetBIOS), 445 (SMB), 135 (end point mapper, rpc), and 5357 (WSD 
network discovery) which is consistent with the firewall rules I described previously. Figure 30 







Figure 30. Port scan results of IPv6 address, Windows 2008 Server “Server Host”  
 
These results agree with IPv4 port scan results, except that port 139 is filtered.  
5.2.5 Connectivity of Windows Server 2008 with firewall “accept all” 
I placed the Windows Server 2008 firewall in an accept all state and ran nmap to the 






Figure 31. Port scan results of IPv4 address, “permit all” fw, Windows 2008 “Server Host”  
 
I was not expecting port 49158 to be open. This must be a dynamic port that opened 
sometime during my testing process. The results of running nmap to the IPv6 address on 






Figure 32. Port scan results of IPv6 address, “permit all” fw, Windows 2008 “Server Host”  
 
Figure 32 shows that all IPv6 ports are open as I expected. I saw that port 49158 is 
open. This port was not reported by netstat and is a “dynamic RPC” process/port. 
5.2.6 Connectivity of Windows Server 2008 with firewall “block all”  
I placed the firewall in a “block all” state and ran nmap first to the IPv4 then to the IPv6 














Figure 34. Port scan results of IPv6 address, , “block all” fw, Windows 2008 “Server Host”  
 
In these cases, nmap is reporting that the host is down because it is not receiving any 
response to the “syn” request it is sending. This behavior is consistent in the case where a 
computer is down or powered off or where a firewall is dropping all “syn” requests. Figure 35 





Figure 35. Port scan with –PN, of IPv6 address, “block all” fw, Windows 2008 “Server Host”  
 
Nmap runs continuously as the ICMPv6, “ping” message sent by nmap to initiate 
communications is dropped by the server host firewall and never replied to. This means the 
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server is either off or not configured to reply to ping requests. After several minutes of 
observing these inconclusive attempts by nmap, I stopped nmap execution manually. This was 
the same experience I had when testing with the firewall on Fedora Core 10.  
5.2.7 Summarizing results with Window Firewall with Advanced Security 
Table 11 summarized the design, status, and port scanning results I achieved with 
“Windows Firewall with Advanced Security.” This table is organized in an identical manner as 
Table 10. The first group of columns describes the inventory of listening services. The second 
group of columns describes the firewall design. The last several columns describe scanning 
results with the firewall in three different states; “as designed”, “accept all”, and “block all.” 
Services are aligned by port number using the firewall rule list as a guide.  
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Table 11. Summary of results, “Windows Firewall with Advanced Security,” 
 
The Windows Firewall with Advanced Security created both IPv4 and IPv6 firewalls from 
common protocol, port rules automatically and simultaneously. However there was no 
indication of this dual stack firewalling until I actually observed it by testing the firewall. The 
firewall worked in the three states “as designed”, “accept all” and “block all.” For the case of 
running the firewall “as design” on the IPv4 interface, I had intended to have only three open 
ports open; 742, 3389, and 80 but I ended up with seven. The additional ports open were 139, 
445, 135, 5357. This was probably the result of the system installation process and the 
firewall firewall
accept all block all
  
proto local addr. foreign ad. state port process rule action proto IP sourc IP dest state dport port status action port status action port status
IPv4 IPv4
1 allow icmp 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 na na
tcp 192.168.100.131 0.0.0.0 LISTEN 139 NetBIOS 2 allow tcp 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 na 139 139 open 139 open
tcp 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 LISTEN 445 SMB 3 allow tcp 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 na 445 445 open 445 open
tcp 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 LISTEN 49152 dyn rpc 4 allow tcp 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 na dyn rpc 49152 open
tcp 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 LISTEN 49153 dyn rpc 4 49153 open
tcp 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 LISTEN 49154 dyn rpc 4 49154 open
tcp 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 LISTEN 49155 dyn rpc 4 49155 open
tcp 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 LISTEN 49157 dyn rpc 4 49157 open
tcp 49158 dyn rpc 4  49158 open
tcp 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 LISTEN 135 epmap rpc 5 allow tcp 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 na RPC e 135 open 135 open
tcp 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 LISTEN 741 nc block 741 open
tcp 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 LISTEN 742 nc 6 allow tcp 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 na 742 742 open 742 open
tcp 2869 UPnP-In 7 allow? tcp 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 na 2869
tcp 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 LISTEN 5357 WSD 8 allow tcp 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 na 5357 5357 open 5357 open
tcp 5358 WSD secure 9 allow? tcp 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 na 5358
tcp 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 LISTEN 3389 rem deskt 10 allow tcp 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 na 3389 3389 open 3389 open
tcp 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 LISTEN 80 https 11 allow tcp 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 na 80 80 open 80 open
tcp 443 https 12 allow? tcp 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 na 443
IPv6 IPv6
1 allow icmp :: :: na na
tcp 139 NetBIOS 2 allow? tcp :: :: na 139
tcp :: :: LISTEN 445 SMB 3 allow tcp :: :: na 445 445 open 445 open
tcp :: :: LISTEN 49152 dyn rpc 4 allow tcp :: :: na dyn rpc 49152 open
tcp :: :: LISTEN 49153 dyn rpc 4 49153 open
tcp :: :: LISTEN 49154 dyn rpc 4 49154 open
tcp :: :: LISTEN 49155 dyn rpc 4 49155 open
tcp :: :: LISTEN 49157 dyn rpc 4 49157 open
tcp 49158 dyn rpc 4 49158 open
tcp :: :: LISTEN 135 epmap rpc 5 allow tcp :: :: na RPC e 135 open 135 open
tcp :: :: LISTEN 761 nc block 761 open
tcp :: :: LISTEN 762 nc 6 allow tcp :: :: na 762 762 open 762 open
tcp 2869 UPnP-In 7 allow tcp :: :: na 2869
tcp :: :: LISTEN 5357 WSD 8 allow tcp :: :: na 5357 5357 open 5357 open
tcp 5358 WSD secure 9 allow tcp :: :: na 5358
tcp :: :: LISTEN 3389 rem deskt 10 allow tcp :: :: na 3389 3389 open 3389 open
tcp :: :: LISTEN 80 https 11 allow tcp :: :: na 80 80 open 80 open
tcp 443 https 12 allow tcp :: :: na 443
no process reported by nstat
no process reported by nstat
closed
no process reported by nstat
no process reported by nstat





no process reported by nstat filtered
no process reported by nstat filtered
no process reported by nstat











































selections I inadvertently made which launched services and created corresponding firewall 
rules. The firewall effectively blocked the dynamic rpc ports. 
The results of nmap scans to the IPv6 address on the server were similar to the IPv4 case 
with the exception of port 139.  
5.3 Results Summary 
Table 12 summarizes my evaluation of “system-config-firewall” and “Windows Firewall 
with Advanced Security” using the criteria I established in section 3.3 or table 7. 
Table 12. Comparison summary of firewall tools against Snyder’s criteria 
 
Fedora Core 10 and Windows Server 2008 include integrated firewall applications; 
system-config-firewall and Windows Firewall with Advanced Security respectively. Both have a 
graphic user interface that allows for roughly equivalent firewall configuration for IPv4 and IPv6 
interfaces based on services, ports, and protocols.  
criteria system-config-firewall
iptables                                        
(supplement to system-config-
firewall)
Windows Firewall with Advanced 
Security
1. OS Fedora Core 10, Linux Linux Windows Server 2008
2. User interface graphical command line graphical
3. IPv4 packet parameters? iptables*
4. IPv6 packet parameters? ip6tables*
5. generate IPv4/IPv6 rules 
simultaneously ?
yes,  writes a  rule for "all" IPv4 
and IPv6 addresses as a default
separate commands are required
yes,  writes a  rule for "all" IPv4 
and IPv6 addresses as a default
6. allow permissible? yes yes yes
7. block all other IP traffic? yes, requires default rule yes, requires default rule yes
8. allow/block all option? yes, service iptable panic yes yes
9. Track state?, e.g. TCP
no configuration available, 
default was NEW
yes, several options none, that I could find
10. Extentions headers some ICMP several, if not all
some ICMP, routing, frag 
preconfigured, possible to specify 
others
11. Ease of use
easy when understood and first 
line is fixed
write rules one by one, scriptable
multiple rules & views for each 
rule
* iptables and ip6tables provide granular control of : source/destination address, port, as well as protocol, tcp values, and logging
Unified view or rules, by service, 
port#, protocol, ICMP type
Unified view, by rule organized 
by profile, incoming/outgoing, 




System-config-firewall required debugging in my case. Windows Firewall with Advanced 
Security is comprehensive, comes with multiple default firewall rules and is well integrated to 
Windows Server 2008 operating system. Both applications can create IPv4 and IPv6 rules 
simultaneously. The command line tool, iptables requires two, slightly different commands to 
work with either IPv4 or IPv6 firewall rules. 
Both applications produced packet filter rules that allowed or blocked packets with 
protocol and port as numbers specified. Specific IP address specifications were possible with 
either application but not part of this testing. Each application had the capability to go into an 
“accept all” and “block all” state. Tracking the state of connections was limited in either 
application. Iptables offers options to track state of TCP and UDP protocols. I could not find a 
similar option in Windows Firewall with Advanced Security.  
Ip6tables offers access to all extension header options. Windows Firewall with Advanced 
Security had several preconfigured filters for ICMPv6, routing, and fragment extension headers. 
System-config-firewall was easy to use once I understood how it worked and fixed the bug that 
it writes. Windows Firewall with Advanced Security was overwhelming at first but over time 






I recommend either system-config-firewall or Windows Firewall with Advanced security 
for creating packet filter firewalls on their respective operating systems for typical network 
services. Neither is perfect, but both can be effective and include adequate features especially 
for the most common network services many of which will be serving both IPv4 and IPv6 
networks. The fact that both tools produced IPv4 and IPv6 rules automatically and 
simultaneously was convenient. Each firewall application required testing and analysis to verify 
effectiveness. The tools netcat, netstat, nmap, and wireshark also worked well with the dual 
IPv4 and IPv6 environment.  
6.2 Future work 
This research did not include testing of IPv6’s extension headers and only focused on 
one type of transport protocol, TCP. Future work could certainly consider these options. 
Firewall mechanisms and test applications will need to be developed for implementations that 
will use IPv6’s extension headers. Testing methodologies for other transport protocols are an 
active area of research. 
The dual IPv4, IPv6 firewall capability of both “system-config-firewall”, “iptables”, and 
“Windows Firewall with Advanced Security” tools was convenient but only really evident after 
testing. Awareness of the capability of these tools is valuable to those needing to consider 
firewall upgrades. My research reaffirms the need for careful design and verification steps in 
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firewall implementation. Additional work would be helpful to automate firewall testing and 
rapidly visualizing the results.  
Egress filtering based on IPv6 addresses is another area for research. My research 
focused on the study of incoming packets or clients trying to connect to processes on a server. 
Studying solutions for packet outflows would be useful. In an IPv6 environment, interfaces will 
have the possibility of multiple addresses, e.g., link-local, global, and multicast. Researching 
methods to manage filter rules for these multiple addresses and automatically create firewall 
rules would be valuable.  
6.3 Summary 
IPv6 is poised to be the successor to IPv4. It offers a fixed size, simplified header that 
removes unused the unused checksum flag and puts options into a series of extension headers. 
IPv6 relieves the shortage of unique IP address numbers by offering 128 bits for address 
specification as compared to 32 bits for IPv4. Preparations include updates to network 
infrastructure such as firewalls and will include support for both IPv4 and IPv6 referred to as 
“dual stack” network interfaces. 
Technology providers have been offering IPv6 capabilities into their product during the 
past decade and “dual stack” implementations often as a default. IPv6 packets function like 
those of IPv4; in fact packet filter firewalling for can be sourced from common transport 
protocol rules.  
This thesis focused on the evaluation of two packet filter firewall applications and how 
they protect “dual stacked” networked services. Both system-config-firewall within Fedora Core 
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10 and Windows Firewall with Advanced Security, within Windows Server 2008 can produce 
effective packet filters for IPv4 and IPv6 network interfaces with a manageable amount of 
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 Appendix A: Usage notes: System-config-firewall and iptables  
Fedora Core 10 includes a firewall management tool called system-config-firewall. It 
features a graphical user interface, creates and applies configuration files to the networking 
portion of the Linux kernel called netfilter.  System-config-firewall is designed for firewalling 
network connections to services running on a given host system. It includes a selection of check 
boxes for popular services and management protocols plus options to specify custom services. 
There are two command line tools useful to create and manage firewall functionality 
with Fedora Core 10, “iptables” and “service.”  Iptables is a powerful command line tool which 
allows control of packet filter functionality.  Iptables is organized into three tables called; Filter 
(inspect packet and apply rules), Mangle (used to alter packets), and NAT (network address 
translation). Within each table are chains or rules for packet forwarding (e.g. routing) or basic 
filtering.  Rules consist of two parts a condition and a resulting action referred to as a “target. “ 
Iptables options include specification of IP packet source, destination addresses and for the 
enclosed protocol; source, destination port number and protocol. Filtering can be applied to IP 
packets coming in from the network interface (INPUT) and/or IP packets leaving a network 
interface (OUTPUT). The iptables command also includes options to engage a state machine 
and log results.  Resulting actions may be to accept, deny, or drop IP packets described by the 
conditions specified. 
Groups of iptable commands are often assembled in a script that builds an entire 
firewall. System-config-firewall produces configuration files compatible with and similar to a 
command line tool called iptables for IPv4 networking and iptables6 for IPv6 networking.   
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Another key command line utility for working with firewalls on Fedora Core 10 is the 
“services” utility.  It provides functionality to view, save, start, stop, and restart the packet filter 
firewall. The configuration file used to boot the firewall is saved in /etc/sysconfig/iptables-
config. Users can not edit this file directly. Instead, rules must be set using iptables then saved 
either using service iptables or another tool called iptables-save.  
Figure 36 describes the firewall tools within Fedora Core 10 and their interaction. The 
Internet Protocol version 6 tools can be accessed by putting a “6” after every IP.   There are 
separate files to describe either IPv4 or IPv6 firewall configuration as interpreted by “iptables” 
and “iptables6.” 
 
Figure 36. IP packet filter tool relationships, Fedora Core  
 
A.1. Fedora Core 10 Firewall from the Control Panel
The control panel is a way to access the general operational features of the firewall
application, system-config-firewall in Fedora Core 10
System, Administration, Firewall
the command line. Figure 37 is an example of the display of the ma
config-firewall.” 
Figure 37. “Trusted Services” window, system
 
I selected services DNS, SMTP, and HTTP 
portion of my selections are visible in figure 37. I clicked on “Other Ports” 
services and these results are shown in figure 38. 
762, both TCP protocol.  These were actually “netcat” processes not “ne
displayed in figure 38. 
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. It can be accessed by clicking through 
, or by typing “system-config-firewall” as an administrator on 
in window for 
 
-config-firewall 
corresponding to ports 25, 53, and 80.
to add custom 
 I added 2 custom ports numbers 742 and 





Figure 38. “Other Ports” window, system
 
System-config-firewall also includes control settings for ICMP and these results are 
shown in figure 39.  I left all selections open as I wanted ICMP ping to be functional along with 
other ICMP messaging.  
Figure 39. ICMP filter window, system
 
After making these settings I clicked on “Apply “which saves these settin







gs to a 
 
A.2. A granular view of firewall rules
A granular view of the firewall rules can be obtained by using a command line tool, 
service iptables status. Fedora Core 10 puts firewall rules 
different locations. To view the IPv4 firewall rules I entered the following command and 
received the following results described in figure 40.
Figure 40. Results of “service iptables status,” Fedo
 
This display organizes the packet filter rules in three groups.
applied to incoming IP packets or ingress filter rules.
not addressed to this host for the purpose of forwarding 
“Output” describes filters or chain rules applied to IP packets that leave the host and go to the 
network. This is also called egress filtering. To view the IPv6 firewall rules I entered the 
following command and received the following results
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related to IPv4 and IPv6 in two 
 
ra Core  
 “Input” describes the rules 
 “Forward” describes accepting IP packets 
them to other network and/or hosts.




Figure 41. Results of “service ip6tables status,” Fedora Core 
 
A.3. Problem with the initial firewall created by system
Rules 1 and 3 are problems.
firewall and make contact with any listening services.
established connections. However, 
number 2 permits ICMP packets 
ping requests. I deleted rules numbers 1 and 3 using two iptables commands





 Rule number 3 will permit ALL incoming packets to pass the 
 Rule number 1 preserves access for any 
I am assuming no previous connections for my testing
to be received by the host. This will allow reply messages to 
 
 > Iptabels –D INPUT 1     




I saved these tables to the config file …
and 43 describe the repaired IP tables. 
Figure 42. Revised iptables 
 
Figure 43. Revised ip6tables 
A.4. Adding a new rule 
Rules can be added using the 
provides the most options, certainty
rejected, or accepted using the –
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 service iptables save, service ip6tables save
sytem-config-firewall or iptables command line.
 and is scriptable. It is possible to log packets dropped, 
log option within the iptables command. 







The firewall tool “system-config-firewall” in Fedora Core 10 was a useful place to get 
started with creating a firewall, but use of iptables and the service utility is also necessary. The 
operation of these three firewall tools is not obvious. The configuration files, based on iptables 
rules, need to be reviewed through inspection and testing. Once the operation of these tools 




Appendix B: Usage Notes: Windows Firewall with Advanced Security 
Windows Server 2008 comes with a firewall tool called Windows Firewall with Advanced 
Security. This tool includes layers of authentication, association and access management that 
go beyond what I shall describe here. There is a command line type of interface called netsh 
(netshell) which I will not discuss in this document. There are several ways to access this tool 
and control the firewall. Instead, I will describe aspects of the interfaces available in Windows 
Server 2008 and how I used this to control the packet filtering capabilities to support my 
experiment.  
B.1 Windows Firewall from the Control Panel 
The control panel is a way to access the general operational features of the firewall and 
an example of one is shown in figure 44. 
 
Figure 44. Windows Control Panel view of Windows Firewall 
 
To open Windows Firewall, one simply clicks on “Windows Firewall” and a view like 




Figure 45. Windows Firewall panel     
 
Access to the settings for the firewall can be gained by clicking on various link words in 
this display. For example, “Turn Windows Firewall on or off” or “Change settings.”  
B.2. Window Firewall Settings 
When “Change settings” is clicked on a display similar to figure 46 will be obtained. The 
settings panes allow one to turn the firewall on (with the existing configuration), block all 
incoming traffic, or turn the firewall completely firewall. Under “exceptions” you can select 
programs or ports to be allowed thus changing the rule set. 
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Figure 46. “General” and “Exceptions” configuration 
 
B.3. Windows firewall from a MMC view 
A granular view of the firewall rules can be obtained from an implementation of the 
Microsoft Management Console (MMC) set up for the firewall. I discovered two ways to get to 
this view. First, I found it in; Server Manager, Configuration. The second way I found it was 
through; All Programs, Administrative Tools, Windows Firewall with Advanced Security. The 
Server Manager View is the easiest to find and will include a bit more clutter on the left hand 





Figure 47. Windows Firewall, MMC view 
 
There are three profiles associated with a Windows firewall. The initial default is for the 
Public Profile and I used this during my testing.  
B.4. Monitoring  
The “monitoring” settings allows for control and access to log files related to this 
firewall.  Figure 48 describes the Monitoring window pane which includes a variety of links. 
 
Figure 48. Windows Firewall, Monitoring 
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B.5. Firewall Properties and Log file settings  
Log file settings can determined from the properties pane for the firewall. Select 
Windows Firewall with Advanced Security and right mouse click on properties to show the 
following windows. The first window is for the overall properties. There are click buttons 
labeled “Customize” to set the settings and log file settings.  
  
Figure 49. Windows Firewall, “Domain” and “Customize” tabs within Properties window 
 
 




Packet data can be logged by placing yes in either or both drop down boxes for Log 
dropped packets and Log successful connections. The log file will create a running list of data 
with column headers or fields that include:  
#Fields: date time action protocol src-ip dst-ip src-port dst-port size tcpflags tcpsyn 
tcpack tcpwin icmptype icmpcode info path 
B.6. Access to individual rules 
Specific inbound or outbound rules may be viewed all at once or as either inbound or 
output subsets. Figure 51 describes a listing of the inbound rules. Green items are enabled 
rules. Gray indicates disabled rules.  
 
Figure 51. Inbound Rules, Windows Firewall with Advanced Security 
 
B.7. Narrowing down the list of rules 
These rules can be filtered using the tools under Actions. Filters sort the rule list by 




Figure 52. Inbound Rules filtered, Windows Firewall with Advanced Security 
 
In Figure 52 results have been filtered by profile and being enabled. Rules may be sorted 
using any of the attributes listed in the column headers. I choose to sort by local protocol (or 
destination protocol). This allow for individual rule selection and management of options. 
B.8. Looking for just TCP protocol related rules 
By clicking on the column header a sort of protocol type can be made. This allows for 
the grouping by protocol type.  
 




Highlighted are all of the TCP services for which access is allowed. There are 12 rules 
(corresponding to over 13 ports). This set includes the custom rule that I added for ports 742 
and 762. The name used to describe each rule is usually very descriptive. Other details may be 
placed in the properties of each rule. Here is an explanation for each of the TCP protocol rules 
listed above.  
1. 139 is a listening service for File and Printer Sharing (NB-Session-In) 
2. 445 is a listening service for File and Printer Sharing (SMB-In) 
3. Dynamic RPC is a listening service for File and Printer Sharing (Spooler Service - 
RPC).  This will use the private port numbers 49152 and greater.  
4. RPC endpoint manager, is a listening service for File and Printer Sharing (Spooler 
Service - RPC-EPMAP) 
5. 742,762, will be listening netcat servers 
6. 2869 is a listening service for Network Discovery, Universal Plug and Play (UPnP) 
7. 5358 and  
8. 5357 are listening servers for Network Discovery (WSD EventsSecure-In) 
9. 3389 is a listening service for Remote Desktop 
10. 80 is for the webserver, enabled when I selected webserver 
11. 443 is for the secure webserver, enabled when I selected webserver 
B.9. Adding a new rule 
Rules can be added by clicking on the “New Rule” icon. A wizard leads you through 
various questions to help you determine the attributes of your rule. The wizard asks you about 
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the type of rule that you are adding. I selected Port and I was asked whether it was TCP or UDP 
transport and the port number. I was prompted to select the Action for the rule whether to 
allow, allow with security (authentication), or to block. Lastly I was asked which profile this rule 
applies to and to give it a name and description. Since I was working on the Inbound list this 
rule will apply to incoming packet traffic only.  
B.10. Properties of a specific rule 
Selecting and clicking on any one of the rules in this display reveals details about each 
rule. For example here is a screen shot of the general properties for a pre-configured firewall 
rule for a Spooler service. This interface allows one to set various aspects of each rule and 
representative display is shown in figure 54. 
  





The Windows Firewall with Advanced Security provides a high degree of functionality 
that is systematically organized. Access to the firewall through the control panel provides basic 
control while access through a preconfigured MMC module provides granular management 
over individual rules. I was able to use Windows Firewall with Advanced Security to successfully 
manipulate the packet firewall state and add custom rules. 
  
